A Criticism to General Semantics
A brief analysis.
Where the value of a theory resides in?
To some, it maybe its capacity to reach new, unexpected discoveries. Breakthroughs that provide benefits in the development of civilization. To others, it maybe its capacity to discern what reality is, independent of its application to life.
Well; I most state, in my own considerations, that the value of a theory or doctrine can reside in more than one aspect, practical or not.
In this, I expect to carry, in a brief take; an analysis of Alfred Korzybski’s General Semantics, in regards to its scientific and factual value. We will navigate the ‘ocean’ of controversies that surround this school of thought, in order to clarify its theoretical bases. While analyzing the ideas and conceptions that emerge of said bases; we will dive into the different criticisms that have appeared throughout the years, including the responses of some advocates or general semanticists.
For this, I have to warn the reader of the strong ‘tides’ that we are going to face in order to reach a better comprehension of the factuality of this multi-disciplinary theory or ‘philosophy’.
So, with that said, let’s sail together.
Measuring the waters…
General Semantics first appeared with the publication of Korzybski’s magnum opus, Science and Sanity in 1933; an extensive work that develops some significant notions Korzybski propounded originally with his other major work, Manhood of Humanity, a concise but crucial book published in 1921. Work that first introduces Korzybski’s concept of “Time-binding”. Or the capacity of “Man” to concentrate and generate knowledge, a ‘human trait’ that makes us capable of progress, thru science and technology, as well as in search for the general weal of the species. Extending the notion that our capacity of rational thinking differentiates us further from animals.
Ever since the original publication of Science and Sanity, important criticisms appeared against the ideas or bases propounded by Korzybski.
Because of that, there is no mystery (to the informed reader) about the status of rejection that General Semantics suffers in respect to its acceptance in different areas to which it claims to have an important say. To some of you, even with the value you consider GS could add to human knowledge, it has been unjustly rejected by the vices of academia.
An example of this stance to the nonacceptance of GS in the academic world, can be found in the writings of general-semanticist, Bruce I. Kodish. In his analysis of the critique done by Max Black, he makes a remark to the ‘cultural’ components within academia, that can cause it to reject valuable aportations just for the seemingly ‘uncleanness’ or, with the lack of a better work, ‘superficial’ aspects of a new idea or theory.
This begs the question: Is this really the case for General Semantics?
To answer this, we have to traverse in the writings of Korzybski himself and some expositions by critics and supporters.
Max Black, in the tenth chapter of his book “Language and Philosophy- Studies in method”. Embarks in a partial (but i must say crucial) analysis of fundamental aspects of GS. That we can classify in three different points. First, the general approach of GS, second, Korzybski’s “non-aristolelian systems” and finally the theory of abstractions propounded by the Count.
Black starts remarking, in his view, that the main goal of Korzybski’s approach is to direct “semantics” into a new, empirical science upon which, “meaning” and “symbolization” have a physiological aspect.
Kodish, in his response to Black, argues that Korzybski’s theory wasn’t a ‘follow up’ of the traditional way of the discipline. Rather, it can be seen more accurately as a theory of human evaluations.
In Science and Sanity, Korzybski states that:
“As my work progressed, it turned out to be ‘speaking about speaking’. Now all scientific works in all fields are written or spoken and so are ultimately verbal […] The present inquiry is limited and partial, but because it deals with linguistic and semantic issues and their physiological and psycho-logical aspects, it is […] unusually general.”
Upon this notion of “speaking about speaking”. Korzybski develops one of the most important theoretical foundations of GS, namely: The role of language on thought.
In Science and Sanity Korzybski propounds that language, including its symbolic aspect, plays a role in the evaluations we humans do about the world. Language, he asserts, is an important aspect of our ‘unlimited’ capacity to abstract and talk about said abstractions, making us different to animals.
The famous sociologist, Neil Postman, in the years he edited the ETC. magazine; noted the similarities between the works of Benjamin L. Whorf and Korzybski.
In both thinkers, language determines, to some extent, the way we perceive reality. Whorf more famously postulates said idea with his analysis of the Hopi indigenous people. In his paper, “An American Indian model of the universe”; Whorf considers that the lack of words, grammatical forms and constructions for time in the Hopi language, as evidence of the lack of a concept for it in their culture; Whorf takes this idea further by stating that languages can have varying kinds of approaches in regards to reality, and to what is generally consider as “universal”. All while these distinct approaches can function perfectly fine in understanding multiple phenomena of the universe, stating that as we have different geometries, we can have different world-views, all equally valid.
The linguistic notions of Korzybski, in the other hand, are proposed to be key in regards to the “sanity” of the human species. Here an important conception of GS takes place and it’s Korzybski’s“non-aristotelian systems”.
We are told in many parts of Science and Sanity that the “semantic problems” that appear in science and life, are due to the “infantile structures” of “Aristotelian systems” upon which we shape our languages. The main objective of Korzybski is to build a “Non-aristotelian” system in order to remove the undesirable traces of the “animalistic one-valued identification”. In order to do so, Korzybski embraces the denial of metaphysical identity.
“Most of the results of the present work involve factors of unusual security of conclusion, though they may violate canons of our ‘philosophical’ creeds. The explanation is astonishingly simple […] The present non-aristotelian system is based on fundamental negative premises; namely, the complete denial of identity”
Here some important explanations are needed. First, as Robert P. Pula wrote; Korzybski (in contrast to Aristotle) denies claims of essentialism in things to which we commonly refer to have certain “unmovable” (in the Scholastic sense) properties. Pula refers to this view of Korzybski, as “things not changing, but changing thinging” (if that makes sense).
Second, the rejection of the ‘absolutism’ from the “Laws of thought” present in the Aristotelian logic. Korzybski replaces aspects of the aforesaid laws, (“the law of identity”, “the law of contradiction” and “the law of the excluded third”) since these present a limitation to broader aspects of reality, and introduces his concept of multi valued-logics and multi-ordinality as a beneficial orientation of thinking.
And finally, Korzybski emphasizes the supposed intricacies between different systems of thought. Mainly referred as “Aristotelian”, “Euclidian” and “Newtonian”. He asserts that these systems, are only particular cases of more general ones. These being the “Non-Aristotelian”, “Non-Euclidian” and “Non-Newtonian”. He views these systems as pillars of the way, even common people (not only the intelligentsia) think. Pillars that are crucial to the evaluative processes that we mentioned before and in the way we respond to the world, or as the Prince calls them: “semantic reactions”.
Korzybski affirms that the importance of said systems resides in their structure (follow me on that), which, in his words, is the only connection to knowledge.
He tells us that, the old “Aristotelian” systems differ to the supposed structure of reality. Leading us to inaccurate evaluations of the world. While the “non-aristotelian” do correspond to said structure. Or in other words:
The map is not the territory
The purpose of this adopted maxima of Korzybski, (and his most famous quote in my consideration) is to urge us to not confuse our symbols or our verbalization to what is “un-speakable”, and as a solution to don’t entrap our interpretations in the different “orders of abstractions”. This confusion, in the notions of the Count, is one of the causes of mental ‘insanity’.
Here I would say, that we have taken a good look of certain bases of General Semantics; a partial outlook, yes, but sufficient for our purposes.
Is time for the (not so) funny part of this analysis.
Time for a bumpy ride.
The good, the bad, and the very ugly…
One of the most controversial aspects of General Semantics is the ‘extremes’ Korzybski went against Metaphysical identity. Max Black in his own chapter, criticizes the various assertions of the Prince, in regards to his critique to the lack of “physical content” of logic (since it relates to said denial).
Black states, in response to the insistence of Korzybski, that said standpoint can be ‘decevious’, as it gives a facade of being free of “rationalistic nonsense”. He asserts that this ‘confusion’ of the function of formal logic, leads Korzybski to criticize it due to its narrow capacity to build certain arguments (as it’s restricted to syllogisms); he exemplifies his point further, by signaling that, rather than throwing out (for example) arithmetic due to its limitations, it should be recognized that its application is limited to certain aspects of reality, the same could be said about identity. A principle which can be employed in formal logic and mathematics.
Bruce Kodish, in his response to Black, correctly expresses (as mentioned before) that Korzybski didn’t criticize Aristotelian logic because of the limitations it presents; quite the contrary. The critique of Korzybski, is to the ‘absolutism’ of the supposed “laws of thought” presented by Aristotle. According to Kodish, Korzybski did recognized the utility of formal aspects of logic and mathematics; while he mentions that the Prince questioned whether purely empirical verification could reflect accurately the level of ‘truth’ of our hypotheses.
Here Kodish’s response is a bit disingenuous, as it doesn’t mention the many instances in which Korzybski asserted that identity was false even in mathematics:
“It should be noticed that all existing mathematical schools accept implicitly, at least, A [Aristotelian] elementalism and do not challenge identity, a principle which happens to be invariably false to facts and which therefore should be entirely abolished.”
True, Korzybski said that experiments don’t necessarily show the ‘whole picture’ of reality; from which we can assert that he acknowledged non-empirical aspects of theories, but he did remarks on the necessity of both empirical and verbal verification as means in search of structure. And as we saw before, Korzybski insisted that the value of languages resides in their correspondence to reality; or, their similarity in structure to that of the structure of the world.
Korzybski’s notion of the implications between the different non-elementalistic systems (the trilogy mentioned before), leads him to assert that the seemingly similar qualities of said systems point out the general characteristics of reality itself. This causes him to commit serious mistakes in regards to the nature of abstract objects; since he affirms that 1=1 in terms of “absolute sameness” is false. He propounds that this is due to the necessity of an “identity” for the nervous system of the writer of the equation, the “identity” of the position of both symbols on the paper, the “identity” in the differences of the ink, and so on.
Even the famous mathematician and philosopher Willard V. Quine criticized Korzybski on this:
“Count Alfred Korzybski […] went so far as to propound a doctrine of nonindentity: identities are always false. Even ‘1=1’ is false he wrote […] He confused the ink spots with the number, abstract and invisible.”
As the Argentinian epistemologist, Mario Bunge, posits in various parts of his work; abstract things exist, but not in the same way physical things do. It doesn’t make sense to talk about the temperature of culture, for example; as it doesn’t make sense to analyze abstract objects in terms of “dimensions”. This is to say that constructs don’t have a state at all, and therefore they can’t change.
Korzybski under his conception is treating all the different constructs that we create, in the same way we would treat physical objects in life.
“Anything with which we deal on the objective levels represents a process, different all the ‘time’, no matter how slow or fast the process might be; therefore, a principle or a premise that ‘everything is identical with itself’ is invariably false to facts.”
All while making dubious claims about neurology, stating that even “identity” doesn’t go in accordance to the “structure” of our nervous systems. This negatively affects his theory of sanity, his theory of abstractions and his “non-aristotelian” conception.
As we mentioned before; the theoretical foundation of “language on thought” is one of the most prominent aspects of General Semantics. By our current knowledge, linguistic determinism and linguistic relativism lack experimental support.
This is not to say that language doesn’t have any influence in how we think; rather, it can be seem as language not having influence in the form and degree theorized by Whorf and Korzybski in their respective ways.
An interesting “Neo-Whorfian” experiment; tested whether having a linguistic distinction between lighter blues and darker ones, could signify a difference in the way speakers of a language perceive different tones. In this case, it was a comparison between Russian speakers and English speakers. The researchers found a noticeable difference in the way both groups perceived the different grades of color, since the Russian speakers (which have words like goluboj or siniy, to refer to the different tonalities of blue) could differentiate in a faster way the different tones that were presented.
It has to be mentioned that the people behind the experiment did a remarkable job in order to test whether language was the deciding factor of the disparity in the groups’ perception. By using different tasks with varying levels of difficulty. They showed that major differences in the reaction times of both groups, appeared when the colors were more similar in tone. In order to discard even further other possible sources of said disparity, the investigators did a second experiment, in which the participants did the same task as in the first one, the difference was a “blockage” to the parts of the brain that process language, with a memory task with numbers.
The results of the former test, showed that Russian speakers had the same reaction time to that of English speakers; they responded in the same way when language was “removed” of the equation.
The intrigued reader could find this as a definitive evidence to the notion that language shapes, at least, our world-views. Needless to say that this idea is unsound with the results of this study; and is also dubious with the body of evidence we have of other studies in regards to the role of language on perception and thought.
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As we mentioned, the research did show differences in the reaction time of both groups when language was ‘present’. The nuance here is that the aforementioned deviation, on average, is just of 124 milliseconds. Way faster than the time it takes our brains to respond to visual stimuli (500 milliseconds). From this, it can’t follow the claim that language can shape our world-views, including other ideas surrounding linguistic relativism, like that “language can shape our cultures”; when the inverse can be true. Our circumstances modifying our language and our culture.
To give more light on this, and because we mentioned it earlier. Ekkahart Malotki, in the decade of the 80’s, found no evidence of Whorf’s claim that Hopis don’t have a concept for time; even after analyzing the way they spoke before Europeans first encountered them. In respect to this findings, the linguist Bernard Comri, accepted that the research of Malotki debunks said statement of Whorf, although he finds his other claims as “questionable”.
We could be here all day long, taking different instances, controversies and whatever we want to select in order to credit or discredit this notion. Like “semantic priming” (which has been scientifically questioned since the reveal of the replication crisis of psychology), or the works of Steven Pinker or Penny Lee.
In any case; it’s clear that we cannot avoid the fact that this notion of “language on thought” is full with controversies and certain vices.
But it’s clear, with the scientific state of things; that we can affirm that some claims by Whorf and Korzybski don’t follow more recent discoveries. Or, to put it differently; that they lack enough evidence to consider them factual.
It can’t be stated with our current knowledge, that language plays a fundamental part in shaping our thoughts or culture. And is also evident, that we can’t state that language takes part in the “sanity” of our cognition, as Korzybski propounded.
In Science and Sanity. Korzybski puts forward with his “theory of sanity”, the conception of “regression”; which is linked in his own view to the “stages of development” of the human race; applying it to understand individual growth and human evolution in different historical moments.
Korzybski, states that mathematics is a useful tool in the analysis of the intricacies of what we call unconscious. While influenced by Sigmund Freud; Korzybski takes a more “general” approach to the study of mental health. In his procedure, Korzbyski affirms that any language is full of conscious and also unconscious structural assumptions (sounds familiar?), a structural unconscious, in his words.
“Any form of representation has its own structural assumptions at its
basis, and when we accept a language we unconsciously accept sets of
silent structural assumptions of which we become semantic victims […] These non-systems are characterized not by the introduction of new assumptions, but by making the older unjustified, primitive, unconscious structural assumptions conscious, and so helping us in eliminating the semantically undesirable reactions”
Korzybski asserts that revising our presuppositions, our unconscious “metaphysics” and ideas; entails the utilization of a “scientific mind-set”; in order to take them into the ‘surface’. This is called “consciousness of abstraction”, and to reach it, the elimination of the word “is” for identity is necessary.
As explained before, the involvement of language in our perceptions and language lacks evidence in the way Korzybski propounded it with his linguistic determinism (due to the heavy influence of the “early” Wittgenstein in his ouevre). And to some extent, it has been empirically discredited.
Some readers could argue in this respect, that the base upon which Cognitive Therapies work, point in favor to the notions provided by Korzybski. Statement that is based on some “scattered” facts; it must be said however, that even while training some aspects of thinking can improve symptoms of certain mental health issues (Watkins et al., 2012), (Dey et al., 2018), said fact doesn’t validate the frame Korzybski propounded with his “thinking stages of humanity”.
In any case, the only direct influence of General Semantics on the field of cognitive therapies was with REBT.
It should be clear, that Korzybski wasn’t the only influence in the development of said therapy. Other thinkers like Zeno and most importantly Epictetus, were key in the work of Albert Ellis; with said fact in mind we can recognize that it’s misleading to state that cognitive therapies (as a conglomerate) somehow point in favor of General Semantics. Which lacks discrimination between the well founded and the not so well founded ideas from GS. This is to say that; you can fail a test even when you got some answers right.
Korzybski was correct to assert that intelligence, as a cognitive phenomena, is an adaptive function of human beings. He was correct to view mind as a receptor of other, external and internal influences (or his “Organism-as-a-whole” concept).
Other critics of Korzybski recognized, like Ernest Nagel, some sound ideas from Science and Sanity. The problem is that, even with this correct assertions. Korzybski couldn’t elevate most of his ‘original’ ideas into a more factual level.
An example of this, is a presumed solution for the “problem of indeterminism” in Quantum mechanics; which Korzybski thoughtlessly reduces it to a “semantic problem”. In the same path of Einstein. Korzybski states that the cause of this ‘riddle’, is the lack of a ‘semantic frame’ (to paraphrase). The lack of such frame, drives our “structures” in a path that makes our theory less congruent with reality. Because of this, Korzybski firstly claims that determinism vs indeterminism is a problem “purely verbal”. And puts on the table, the concept of infinitely-valued determinism.
Idea that has been completely discredited by Bell’s theorem (although the first experiments behind Bell’s inequalities were done until 1972). Ever since experimental confirmation, Bell’s theorem has been proven right even with more rigorous sets and tests.
The devil is in the details. Martin Gardner, in the exposition he does of General Semantics in “Fads and Fallacies in the name of Science”, mentions that Korzybski’s theory is a borderline example of pseudoscience, contrasting it to other doctrines (like dianetics).
Many advocates seem to consider Gardner as one of the faultiest critics of Korzybski. An example of this, is the response of Bruce Kodish to Gardner’s chapter. In it, Kodish treats the exposition from “Fads and Fallacies” as a form of critical analysis. Naturally, the approximation of Kodish leads him to indict Gardner of fallacious rhetoric and for some reason to sustain a tone of disregard to the work of Korzybski.
Kodish, for what it seems, is in a ‘rush’ to indict Gardner when the opportunity presents itself.
An example is when Gardner writes that Korzybski didn’t recognize a long tradition against bad linguistic habits of thought.
Kodish ‘dazed’ by one of the characteristics enlisted by Gardner of “pseudo-scientists” ( “Cranks work in almost total isolation from their colleagues [...] in the sense of having no fruitful contacts with fellow researchers.”), goes to misrepresent Gardner’s claim, stating that Korzybski did recognize the work of many thinkers before him, including philosophers.
The criticism of Gardner is to the statement of Korzybski that: “[Scientists and normal people] disregard entirely structural, linguistic, and semantic issues, simply because no one has, as yet, formulated these problems or shown their importance.”
Other example is the supposed use of the word “Count” in a depreciatory way by Gardner. Kodish writes:
[Note] “7. […] Gardner’s continuing reference to Korzybski as “The Count” may qualify as another fascinating irrelevancy intended for disparagement.”
Why Kodish went as far as to imply that?
Isn’t “safer” to assume that writing down the word ‘Count’ was way easier than to constantly write Korzybski; as to avoid too the repetition of the same name again and again?
This ‘accusation’, sort to speak, has been echoed in an old article of easy access in the “World & Thinking” page. An important difference arises, since the author of this article argues that the use of the word “Count” is intended to introduce some sort of “emotional” component, in order to denigrate the persona of Korzybski and influence the reader.
Strangely enough, the article in its riposte to the famous Skeptic, contradicts certain claims of Korzybski. Gardner writes, in his point of view, that the “crusade” of the Prince against “Aristotelian” habits or assumptions; is directed to a fictitious windmill that doesn’t have any resemblance to the work of Aristotle. He also states that the use of the principle of identity can have its place, due to the fact that mathematical structures are built on isomorphic relations that depend on it.
The author writes:
“Since the inception of GS it has become quite well known that “is identical to” is a concept that is valid only in the realm of mathematics (more correct: formal languages), and invalid in normal language and the real world it describes — in these realms there is only one meaning for “is”, which is “is approximately”.”
As we saw before, Korzybski also considered identity “invariably false to facts” in the realm of mathematics. He was ready to ‘throw it out’ of the window, except in the study of mentally ill people in psychiatric hospitals.
The article makes a very short mention of Max Black as well; to which the author considers his critique as “mild”. Proceeding to make bold speculations of the ‘psychology’ behind the motives of Black and Gardner.
“In search for a cause of these violations of decent reasoning, one may note that frequently, or even usually, these repulsive emotions are caused by a conflict between internal ideas and what comes from outside […] Gardner and Black do not like GS, because it is an idea not like their own. And because it is an idea not like their own, they do not like it, and because they do not like it, they try to find arguments against it.”
Imagine the case in which a critic (like me) writes down that the misrepresentations of Kodish and those of the author of this article, are due to the “unconscious” bias that operates in order to negate any valid or blunt criticism that challenges the theory upon which their careers, beliefs, world view, ideology or persona is built on; causing them respond to the critics in an irrational manner.
Is a fancy and irrelevant speculation. Even if it’s sustained by the inadequacies of the exponents of GS. But then serious questions about the objectivity of said writings would arise.
The reaction of various supporters of General Semantics to the many criticisms that arose thru the years, is worrying.
As is worrying the lack of theoretical development GS has received since its conception, almost a hundred years ago.
Jeffrey A. Mordowitz, asseverates in his article for the General Semantics Bulletin in 1990 that:
“the new molecular biological disciplines represent an out-growth of the colloidal chemistry of the 1920’s and 1930’s, and not a denial of the date to which Korzybski based his formulations”
Incredible!
Really. Your notions can be left intact even with new developments in science, almost 60 years later.
Even when it’s true that those new disciplines are not a ‘re-elaboration’ of colloidal chemistry. It’s at least, doubtful (as Mordowitz contends) that Korzybki’s notions didn’t require a serious revision due to our new understandings in Biology.
Theories like General Relativity or Evolution have changed drastically since their first formulations. And still today, they present certain problems to explain some phenomena.
The mathematician, Anatol Rapoport (which had an interesting relationship with General Semantics) commented:
“In view of Korzybski’s fundamental thesis, his misuse of scientific terminology is ironic, and many scholars and scientists were quick to dismiss Korzybski as a dilettante, at times a crank. This impression was reinforced by Korzybski himself. On occasions he lectured to scientists in the manner of a patronizing schoolmaster on subjects to which they had devoted many years of hard, careful work and of which he had only a smattering of knowledge.”
Conclusion
A lot of important subjects and nuances were discarded in the course of my analysis (to which I apologize). But I feel that it can be assured that important aspects and arguments were touched in enough depth to reach a conclusion.
My verdict is that General Semantics belongs to the realm of pseudoscience. Mainly by the theoretical flaws present in Korzybski’s theory, and the lack of independent research outside the Institute of General Semantics.
To the supporter of General Semantics; I only have to say that important lessons can be learned by accepting the mistakes in an adopted theory.
Accepting; for example, that the role of language has been shown not to be as prominent in thought, as Whorf and Korzybski propounded originally. Recognizing that the modern understanding of mental health differs greatly with the conceptions of Korzybski. Specifically, that mental issues (like OCD or depression) affect rational thinking, not irrational, “Aristotelian” (in the Korzybskian conception) thinking or habits causing said mental health issues (except in certain personality disorders, but there are more factors to it).
Before ending my analysis, I consider important to clarify a more personal position.
And is that… I am in full sympathy with the inquiry and some of the objectives of Alfred Korzybski.
Mainly, with the unification of scientific knowledge.
I would say that this is not surprising for me; due to the fact that Korzybski was heavily influenced by the Vienna-circle. And I can assure that other critics can agree with many stand-points of the Polish-American thinker.
One can agree with certain ideas and particularities of General Semantics; for example, the idea that mathematics has an inherent human component, or Korzybski’s indirect criticism to Metaphysical Platonism. One can agree with the larger vision that our cognition is limited, and that this limitation causes us to miss certain aspects of reality; including the dangers of not realizing that we are restricted creatures in respect to our capacity to discern the real world.
But we can’t blind ourselves with a bandage woven with agreement and intellectual compatibility. And that neither signifies to lock up ourselves with irrational rejections to criticisms because of the supposed hostility of critics.
Anyone, without considering their respective and ultimately unavoidable, subjective or biased assumptions; can still point out the mistakes or questionable aspects of Koryzbski’s work, with accuracy and reason.
