Defending a Professor Does Not Mean Agreeing with Him
Michel DeGraff’s case raises a fundamental question about how universities should balance academic freedom, professional accountability and institutional authority.
Defending a professor in a university dispute does not require agreeing with all his political positions, endorsing every public statement or accepting his account of events without scrutiny. It requires something more fundamental: insisting that institutional decisions affecting an academic’s career be justified by evidence, fair procedures and proportionate measures.
The case of Michel DeGraff, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology linguist known for his work on Haitian Creole and language-based educational inequality, offers an opportunity to examine this principle. His scholarship has challenged the marginalization of Creole languages and advocated educational approaches that take students’ linguistic backgrounds seriously. However, his institutional dispute raises questions extending beyond the merits of that work to the relationship between a scholar and the university employing him.
The distinction between scholarly achievement and professional conduct is essential. A distinguished publication record does not exempt an academic from institutional rules, just as controversial political opinions do not automatically establish professional misconduct. Universities must be able to investigate credible allegations concerning conduct, protect students and colleagues, and maintain appropriate professional standards. Equally, they must distinguish demonstrable misconduct from legitimate disagreement or criticism of institutional policy.
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This is where procedural fairness becomes indispensable. When a university restricts a professor’s teaching, mentoring or departmental participation, it should explain the grounds for those restrictions, identify the evidence supporting them and provide a meaningful opportunity for review. The measures imposed should correspond to the conduct established, rather than to the discomfort that controversial ideas may generate.
These principles apply regardless of whether one sympathizes with the professor, disagrees with his politics or remains undecided about the dispute. Indeed, neutrality requires resisting two opposite temptations: treating the professor as automatically vindicated because he challenges institutional authority, and assuming that the university must be right because of its reputation and administrative standing.
DeGraff’s proposed course connecting linguistics, decolonization and political conflict also illustrates the importance of academic scrutiny. Universities are entitled to assess whether a course has appropriate disciplinary foundations, sufficient historical context and a rigorous approach to contested interpretations. Academic freedom does not guarantee approval of every proposal. But rejection should rest on defensible academic reasons, applied consistently and explained transparently.
The wider stakes concern the credibility of higher education. Universities ask students to question authority, examine evidence and distinguish arguments from assumptions. They undermine those lessons when their own decisions appear insulated from equivalent scrutiny. Therefore, institutional accountability should apply not only to individual academics but also to the bodies empowered to discipline them.
None of these principles establishes whether every action taken by MIT was justified or whether every claim made by DeGraff is correct. Those conclusions require careful examination of the available evidence and the parties’ competing accounts.
Hence, the appropriate defense is neither unconditional loyalty to a professor nor unquestioning confidence in an institution. It is a defense of the standards by which both should be judged. Academic freedom and professional responsibility are not mutually exclusive. A university worthy of public trust must protect legitimate scholarly inquiry while addressing substantiated misconduct fairly. The ultimate test is not whether institutions avoid controversy, but whether they can resolve it without abandoning the principles they teach.
