MediumAndroid Pentesting Part 3. Dynamic Findings: | by Aerialist71 | Oct, 2026 | Medium
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Aerialist71

Android Pentesting Part 3

6 min readOct 20, 2026

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Dynamic Findings:

Android dynamic analysis involves testing an application while it is running to identify security vulnerabilities that may not be apparent through static analysis alone.

Unlike static analysis, which focuses on reviewing source code and configuration files, dynamic analysis allows testers to observe the application’s runtime behavior, network communications, authentication mechanisms, and interactions with the underlying operating system.

Tools such as Burp Suite, Frida, and Objection help security testers intercept network traffic, inspect application behavior, and assess security controls under different runtime conditions. During this phase, testers should focus on insecure network communication, improper session management, authentication and authorization flaws, sensitive data exposure, SSL/TLS certificate validation, and runtime security mechanisms.

Each finding should be validated with a practical proof of concept (PoC), supported by appropriate evidence, and mapped to the relevant OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) recommendations.

The ultimate goal is to understand how the application behaves in real-world scenarios, determine the actual impact of identified vulnerabilities, and recommend effective remediation measures. So lets get started with the impact

DA-01 SSL Pinning Not Implemented

The application does not implement certificate or public-key pinning. Once a trusted proxy certificate is installed on a test device, traffic between the app and its backend can be intercepted and inspected using a proxy tool such as Burp Suite.

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Application traffic intercepted via proxy, confirming the absence of SSL pinning

DA-02 No Anti-Debugging Mechanism Implemented

The application does not detect or block an attached debugger. A tester was able to attach jdb / Frida to the running process and step through, hook, or modify its runtime behaviour.

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The application accepts a debugger attachment without any detection or restriction.

DA-03 Missing Useful HTTP Security Headers

Server responses returned to the app’s API calls omit several recommended security headers, including Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, and Cache-Control directives on responses that carry sensitive data.

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API response headers captured during testing, showing the missing security headers.

DA-04 Adversary Can Fingerprint the Application Server From HTTP Responses

Server response headers disclose backend software and version information — including web server and application framework version banners — that were captured during testing.

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Server version information disclosed in the HTTP response headers.
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Application framework version disclosed in a separate response.

DA-05 Password Replay Attack

A previously captured authentication request — including the credentials or tokens it contains — can be resent to the server and is accepted again, indicating the backend has no protection against request replay.

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An authentication request captured during testing
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The same captured request successfully replayed against the server.

DA- 06 TLS Padding Oracle Information Disclosure Vulnerability (TLS POODLE)

Closely related to the SSLv3 finding above, the server’s TLS configuration includes CBC-mode cipher suites that remain susceptible to padding-oracle attacks capable of leaking encrypted content byte-by-byte.

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TLS configuration scan confirming the padding-oracle weakness

DA-07 Session Cookie Attributes Are Not Set Properly

Session cookies issued by the backend are missing recommended security attributes — specifically Secure, HttpOnly, and/or SameSite.

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Session cookie captured during testing, showing the missing security attributes.

DA-08 Adversary Can Access the Default Web Page

An embedded web endpoint reachable by the application exposes a default or placeholder web page directly, rather than the app-controlled content that end users are expected to see.

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The default web page reachable directly through the application’s embedded browser component.

DA-09 Mobile App URL Accessed Through a Web Browser

Backend endpoints intended to be consumed only by the mobile application were found to be directly reachable from a standard desktop web browser, without any app-specific validation preventing access.

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A mobile-app-only URL loaded and rendered successfully in a desktop web browser.

DA-10 Adversary Can Perform Malicious Activity via Parameter Manipulation

Request parameters — including object identifiers, role flags, and monetary amounts — can be altered using an intercepting proxy, and the server processes the modified values without adequate authorisation checks.

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Original request parameters captured prior to manipulation.
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Parameters modified using an intercepting proxy
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The server processes the manipulated request without additional authorisation checks.
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Resulting unauthorized outcome from the manipulated request

Chapter Summary & Key Takeaways

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Dynamic analysis provides valuable insights into an Android application’s security posture by examining its behavior during execution. Throughout this chapter, we explored how to intercept and analyze application traffic using Burp Suite, investigate runtime behavior, and identify vulnerabilities through practical testing techniques.

Key Takeaways

  • Network Traffic Analysis: Inspect HTTP/HTTPS communications to identify sensitive data exposure, insecure transmission, and improper certificate validation.
  • Authentication & Session Management: Evaluate login mechanisms, session handling, token security, and logout functionality.
  • Data Exposure: Examine application behavior for sensitive information leakage through network traffic, logs, runtime storage, and application responses.
  • Runtime Security Testing: Analyze application behavior using tools such as Frida and Objection to assess the effectiveness of security controls.
  • Vulnerability Validation: Develop practical PoCs, collect supporting evidence, assess business impact, and distinguish genuine vulnerabilities from false positives.
  • Remediation & Reporting: Document each confirmed finding with its severity, technical details, impact, reproduction steps, and recommended mitigation.

Remember: Dynamic analysis complements static analysis; neither approach is sufficient on its own to establish an application’s overall security posture. Combining both approaches provides broader coverage and helps testers identify vulnerabilities that might otherwise go undetected.

In this new age era there are also other super critical and high findings that one should read like intent injection, content provider bypass using drozer, task hijacking, calling internal activity without authentication.

So, keep learning, exploring, and sharpening your skills! If you have any suggestions for improving this article or would like me to cover other Android application security concepts in more detail, feel free to share your thoughts in the comments. Your feedback and suggestions are always welcome!

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