MediumTransparency Is Not the Answer to Its Own Question | by Bruno Baketarić | Agile Insider | Nov, 2026 | Medium
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Transparency Is Not the Answer to Its Own Question

12 min read23 hours ago

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There is a sound that runs through almost every organisation I have been able to observe closely, and it does not change much with the size of the organisation. It is the call for more transparency. It rolls up the hallways and back down them. If only people had more of it, and sooner, the decisions would be better and the actions clearer. The right things would get built, faster, by people who understood why they were building them. The story has a destination, and the destination is always the same: a better organisation, arrived at by the simple expedient of letting more people see more things.

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I have heard this in a firm small enough that everyone still knew everyone. I have heard it, in almost identical words, inside an enterprise of tens of thousands. The constancy is the part worth noticing. If the same demand appears with the same intensity at a dozen people and at ten thousand, then whatever is producing it is not a feature of organisational scale. It is something more portable than that. It travels with the people, not with the structure.

This essay is about what that something is. Not because the demand is unreasonable. Most of the people making it are sincere, and some of what they are asking for is real. It is about why the demand takes the particular form it takes, why feeding it does not satisfy it, and why it grows loudest in exactly the places where it can help least.

The self-image underneath the demand

Start with an assumption that almost nobody in knowledge work states out loud, because stating it is unnecessary. Everyone already holds it.

We believe we are competent. Not arrogantly, and not without grounds: the competence is usually real, acquired through training and practice and the slow accumulation of experience into something that occasionally feels like intuition. And we believe we are, for the most part, rational. Not unfeeling, but capable of setting feeling aside when it matters and reasoning our way to the right call. The picture we carry of ourselves at work is a picture of a sound instrument: give it good inputs and it produces good outputs.

From that picture, one conclusion follows so directly that it does not feel like a conclusion at all. If the quality of what I decide is determined by the quality of what I know, then better decisions require better information. The instrument is fine. It is the inputs that need improving.

That is the rational-actor theory of one’s own working life, and it is held implicitly by people who would never phrase it that way and might object to it if it were phrased for them. It is not a stupid theory. In some bounded settings it is even approximately true. But it has a property worth dwelling on: it is a theory about oneself that places the cause of every disappointing outcome outside oneself. The reasoning was sound. The information was not sufficient. From inside the theory, that is not a self-serving move. It is just what the theory says.

Hold onto that, because it is the engine of everything that follows.

What transparency is standing in for

When people ask for transparency, they are usually asking for something. The word is rarely doing the work it appears to be doing. It is a single, respectable container into which several quite different needs have been poured, and the needs do not look much like each other once you separate them out.

The mildest case is the one where the demand is almost right. What is actually missing is not hidden information but clarity. The strategy was communicated; it was simply communicated ambiguously. The message from the top went out, was received, and was read three different ways by three people who then discovered, comparing notes, that they had been planning against three different futures. The thing they lack is not a fact someone is sitting on. It is a resolution of ambiguity in what they have already been given. This case matters because the remedy the demand reaches for is exactly the wrong one. More information does not resolve an ambiguity; it produces more surface for ambiguity to form on. The need is real and the named solution makes it worse, and that gap between the two is the first sign that the word is not describing the need accurately.

A second case is harder to see because it contains a small, reasonable-looking piece of theory. A decision changes. A position that was held last quarter is no longer held. Someone at a distance from where the change happened observes the change and reasons their way to an explanation: decisions change when new information arrives; this decision changed; therefore new information arrived; therefore information exists that I was not given. Every step in that chain is locally sensible, and the conclusion is an inference about concealment that may be entirely false. The decision may have moved for reasons that were not informational at all. A constraint shifted. Pressure arrived from somewhere and was absorbed somewhere else. The same evidence was simply read differently the second time by people under different load. But the folk model of how decisions move only has one mechanism in it, and the mechanism is information, so the absence of visible information becomes evidence of withheld information. What is being demanded here is not really transparency. It is predictability: the assurance that the ground will not move, or that if it moves, the person will see it coming. The demand for information is what that need looks like when it is forced through a model that only knows how to talk about information.

A third case is about standing. People cannot contribute to a decision they cannot see, and there are decisions people feel, often correctly, fall squarely within their own expertise. To speak to such a decision, they need to know it is being made and on what basis. So the demand for information is, underneath, a demand for the standing to speak: a claim to be in the room, expressed as a claim to be informed, because being informed is the precondition the rational-actor self-image will allow them to name. The need is to participate. The word that comes out is a word about knowing, because knowing is the only entry the model accepts as the price of a seat.

And there is a fourth case, the least innocent of them, and it is best approached from its quietest end. After a decision has gone badly, when the question of who might have said something is in the air, I would have spoken up, had I known is available as an account of one’s silence. Held by one person, after one event, this is a small thing: a hedge, reached for under pressure, often half-believed by the person reaching for it. What makes it the fourth case rather than a footnote to the third is what happens to it when it stops being individual. Once it is generally accepted, ambiently and without anyone having to argue it in the moment, that the organisation lacks transparency, the hedge no longer needs a person to hold it. It has been pre-ratified. A decision that goes wrong, an accountability that lands, a question about why something was not caught: all of these can be set against a deficit the organisation has already agreed it has, by no one in particular, in advance of any specific need for it. The individual no longer has to make the move, because the environment makes it for them. And that is what gives almost everyone a reason to maintain the belief, regardless of whether they privately hold it: its standing as accepted background is useful to all of them, and useful precisely in proportion to how little anyone has to do to invoke it. Nobody has to intend this for it to operate. It is the same shape as a context-stripped management aphorism that survives because it serves the people who repeat it: the deficit narrative persists because a satisfied demand would remove the protection the unsatisfied one provides. This is the darkest of the four, and it has to be stated carefully, because it sounds like an accusation and it is not one. No individual is being charged with bad faith. The point is structural. The system makes the maintenance of the deficit narrative rational, and people inside it do the rational thing without needing to decide to.

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Four needs, then, wearing one word: clarity, predictability, standing, cover. They are not variants of each other. They descend, roughly, from the almost-innocent to the barely-conscious, and then past the individual altogether into something the system holds on everyone’s behalf. What they have in common is not their content. It is what happens to them on the way to being voiced.

Why it always comes out as information

Each of those needs, on the way from being felt to being said, passes through the same filter and comes out the same shape.

The obvious explanation is social. Information is the respectable thing to ask for. Asking for influence sounds political. Asking for reassurance sounds fragile. Asking for cover cannot be asked for at all. Asking for information sounds like exactly what a competent, rational professional would ask for, because it is the request the rational-actor self-image endorses. On that account, people know, more or less, what they actually need, and they relabel it as an information deficit because the relabelling is what the environment will accept.

I do not think the social account is wrong, but I think it is the weaker half of the truth, and stopping there would let the essay accuse its reader of a bad faith most readers do not have. Picture the person actually saying it. They are not concealing anything. If you asked them, directly and in good faith, whether they wanted information or whether they wanted to be in the room, they would tell you it was the information, and they would mean it. They would pass any test of sincerity you could devise, because there is nothing insincere going on. The standing they lack is not a thing they are hiding from you. It is a thing they cannot find by looking inward, because the looking is done with the same instrument that has no reading for it. This is what the social account misses. It assumes the need is visible to the person and merely impolitic to name. Often it is not visible to them at all.

The stronger version, then, is this: most of the time, people are not relabelling a need they can see. They cannot see it. The rational-actor model of oneself does not merely constrain what one is willing to ask for. It constrains what one is able to perceive oneself as lacking. The model has a slot for I was given insufficient information. It does not have a slot for I lack standing, or I am protecting myself, or the ambiguity here is irreducible and no amount of information will dissolve it. Those are not descriptions the instrument can form about itself, because the instrument’s account of itself is precisely that it is an instrument: sound, rational, output determined by input. A need that cannot be phrased in the language of input is, from inside that account, not a need that is visible. It is felt as an information gap because an information gap is the only thing the model can render.

This is the same mechanism, in a different setting, that runs underneath the rest of the work I have been doing here. The manager formed by years of reward for performing certainty does not experience the planning-and-control frame as a frame; it presents itself as professionalism, and the framedness is invisible from inside it. The practitioner whose expertise has fused with identity does not experience the boundary on their curiosity as a boundary; the filtering happens before evaluation begins, and the closed door is never seen as closed. The signature is the same each time. The mechanism is invisible from the position it shapes, and the people it shapes are not failing to look. They are looking with an instrument that has no setting for the thing they would need to see.

The loop that cannot be fed

There is a second reason the demand is never satisfied, and it is mechanical rather than psychological. Even setting aside what transparency is standing in for, feeding the literal demand does not work, and it does not work in a way that makes the demand grow.

Watch what happens when an organisation takes the call seriously and responds in its own terms. Effort goes into making decisions visible. What was decided, by whom, on what basis, on whose reading of what evidence. The volume of internal information rises, because that is what responding to the demand means. And then the volume of internal information becomes its own problem. At some earlier point a person could hold the relevant picture in their head. Now they cannot, and the effort is no longer only in digesting the information but in finding it at all. The people who do put in that effort, the ones who actually go and read across the now-considerable record, are the ones who start to notice that it does not cohere. What was written here does not match what was written there, which sits oddly against a third thing said somewhere else. The same statement from the top, read against more context, now supports more readings, not fewer.

So the interpretations diverge further, and the divergence is read, correctly within the model, as evidence that something is still missing. There must be a piece still in the shadows; bring a light to it and the picture will finally cohere. More transparency is needed. The response to the divergence is another increment of the thing that produced it.

This is the loop, and it has no natural floor. Information does not converge interpretation, because interpretation is not a function of information quantity. Past a certain point, more of it produces more surface for divergence, which produces more conviction that the missing piece is just out of sight, which produces more demand. The organisation that responds most diligently to the call for transparency is, by responding, manufacturing the conditions under which the call gets louder. And the fourth need from earlier closes the trap from the other side: even if the loop could be fed to satisfaction, there is a standing structural reason for no one to want it fed, because a satisfied demand removes the cover the unsatisfied one provides. The loop is not merely self-sustaining through failure. It is, without anyone intending it, protected.

What this does not resolve into

The temptation at this point is to end with the better question. Stop asking for transparency; ask for what you actually need. Name the clarity, the predictability, the standing. Say the real thing.

I do not think that ending is available, and the reason is the whole argument. If the central claim is right, the people inside the demand cannot, for the most part, see what they actually need, because the model through which they perceive their own working lives renders every need as an information need. You cannot instruct someone out of a blindness whose defining property is that it does not feel like one. Telling a person that their demand for transparency is really a demand for standing does not give them access to the need; it gives them a sentence they have no way to verify from where they stand, because verifying it would require the very perception the model removes. This is the same place the work on management formation ended, and for the same reason. The problem is not a deficit of knowledge. Supplying the knowledge changes very little, because the environment, and the self-image the environment installs, punishes or simply cannot register acting on it.

What is left is smaller and harder than a recommendation, and it is the only honest thing I can offer in place of one. The people who manage to notice any of this tend to share a single, uncommon disposition. They hold the picture of themselves as a rational instrument a little loosely. Not loosely enough to stop trusting it, which would be its own kind of failure, but loosely enough that when they hear themselves asking for more information, they can occasionally entertain the possibility that information is not the thing they are short of. That disposition cannot be taught by being described, which is the recurring difficulty in all of this. It can only be held, or not, and most of the structures people work inside make holding it harder rather than easier.

The cry for transparency is not a problem to be solved by transparency. It is the sound a particular theory of ourselves makes when it is under strain, and it gets louder, reliably, in exactly the places where that theory is failing most visibly and is least able to say so. That it does not vary with the size of the organisation was the first clue. It was never about the organisation. It was about what we cannot afford to see about how we decide, and the word we reach for, in good faith, to keep from having to look.

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Bruno Baketarić
Bruno Baketarić

Ex-Dev & Ex-Head of ... now Improving Flow @ SAP. I draw from lean, agile, kanban, complexity theory, systems thinking and social sciences. Opinions are my own.

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